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Nuel Belnap formulated his paradox in the following manner:
Let  symbolize the denotation function, and let us baptize
the symbol \ `a+ 1' ", using the letter \a" for its name; that
is, we declare that a=`a+ 1'. So by applying the denotation-
function, , to both sides, we readily obtain a = (`a+ 1'). But
(`a+ 1')=a+ 1 (because  is denotation), so a = a+ 1. As
a result, there is a paradox. Ordinary Peano arithmetic says that
the adding-one function has no xed point: n+ 1 6= n, all n. But
this stands in contradiction to what we have just shown, that
a = a+ 1, i.e., that a is a xed point of adding one.
Nuel Belnap (2006: Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox,
http://www.pitt.edu/ belnap/143prosentence.pdf, Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research Vol. LXXIII, No. 3, November, pp. 705{712.)
It is clear that in the formula `a+ 1', the term `a' denotes a number and not
a numeral, because in this context the addition is a mathematical operation
that is dened on numbers and not signs, thus the reasoning is grammatically
correct. From a semantic point of view, Belnap emphasized the similarity
between his paradox and another circular paradox:
We may also \solve" the Adder in analogy to the three-valued
\solution" to the Liar paradox. That is, we may let u be \the un-
grounded number," following Kleene arithmetic by declaring that
u is a xed point for the adding-one function: u+ 1 = u. Then
we can let the denotation of a be u, which \solves" the paradox.
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. . . the Adder is exactly the same as the Liar, mutatis mutandis :
Given the Liar and no hierarchy, either negation has a xed point,
in which case we are not doing (ordinary two-valued) semantics,
or else, if negation has no xed point, we have a contradiction in
our semantic theory.
Let me shed some light on the connection to the Liar paradox following
Belnap's argumentation in another way. Let `' be Kleene's three-valued
negation, where `s' is a sentence: 1=True, 0=False, 2=not True and not
False, and jsj is the logical value of s sentence.
The truth table:
s  s
1 0
0 1
2 2
This means:
(A1) If 1 = jsj then 0 = j  sj
(A2) If 0 = jsj then 1 = j  sj
(A3) If 2 = jsj then 2 = j  sj
(A4) 0 6= 1 and 1 6= 2
Let L be the Liar sentence formulated by (1):
*(1) L$ df  L (This is a circular denition.)
*(2) L$  L (1)
*(3) 2 = jLj $ 2 = j  Lj (2) (A3)
(4) If L$ df  L then 2 = jLj (3)
In other words, the Liar sentence does not express a proposition, because
it is neither true nor false. Consider, then, the following inference of the
Adder paradox:
2
(A1) For all x, if x is a nite number then x 6= x+ 1
(A2) 8x, x = (dxe)
*(1) a = `a+ 1'
*(2) (a) = (`a+ 1') (1) (A2)
*(3) (`a+ 1') = a+ 1 (A2)
*(4) a = a+ 1 (1) (3)
(5) If a = `a+ 1'. Then a = a+ 1 (1)(4)
(6) If a is a nite number then a 6= a+ 1 (A1)
(7) a is not a nite number but something else,
e.g. a innite cardinal number. (1)(5)(6)
In both cases there is a xed point.
The above solution does not work if we insist that the Liar sentence is
true or false or that a is a nite number. Solving the Liar paradox in the
framework of classical logic or semantic and denition theory, we must use
language levels and dierent truth predicates. The following brief outline of
Tarski's solution is based on an interpretation of the Axiom of Specication:
To every set of sentence names P and to every one-to-one map from sentence
names to sentences S(x) there corresponds a set of sentence names T whose
elements are exactly those elements x of P for which S(x) holds.
\Axiom of specication: To every set A and to every condition S(x)
there corresponds a set B whose elements are exactly those elements x
of A for which S(x) holds." Paul R. Halmos (1960: Naive Set Theory,
http://www.questia.com/read/10345494, Van Nostrand., Princeton, NJ., p.6)
Let P; P1 be sets of sentence names; T; T1; T2 sets of true sentence names;
and S; 1 one-to-one maps (bijective functions) from sentence names to sen-
tences.
(1) 8P8S9T8x(x 2 T $ (x 2 P &S(x))) Axiom of Specication
(2) 8S9T8x(x 2 T $ (x 2 P1&S(x))) (1)
(3) 9T8x(x 2 T $ (x 2 P1& 1(x))) (2) 1 where 1()$ df 62 T1
(4) 8x(x 2 T2 $ (x 2 P1& 1(x))) (3)T2
(5)  2 T2 $ ( 2 P1& 1()) (4)
(6)  2 T2 $ ( 2 P1& 62 T1) (5)
(7)  2 P1 ! ( 2 T2 $  62 T1) (6)
Assuming that we have only a unique set of Truth (T2 = T1), the conse-
quence is logical fallacy, thus if  2 P1 , that is, if  is a true or false sentence
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(x 2 P1 := x expresses a proposition), then we must use dierent sets of
true sentences that are extensions of dierent truth predicates at dierent
language levels.
Belnap claims:
We may \solve" the Adder paradox in the Tarski way, by classi-
fying it as due to bad grammar (a =`a+1' both uses \a" on the
left, and mentions it on the right).
Belnap is right regarding the similarity, but he fails to localize the root of the
disease. He should not degrade Tarski's solution of semantic paradoxes by
using quotation marks, but should apply Tarski's theory properly. For Tarski,
every semantic functor, such as the `denote' function or `true' predicate,has a
certain level that is connected to a given language. This means that we have a
`denote1' function (1) in language1 and `denote2' function (2) in language2.
Let us suppose that: (D2) 8x 2 terms of language2, x = 2(dxe) := For
every x terms of language2, dxe denotes2 x that is \ `a' " denotes \a", \ `b'
" denotes \b", etc. \Julius Caesar" denotes a Roman general but \ `Julius
Caesar' " denotes a name of a Roman general. (Where d e is the symbol for
the citation function or quasi-quotation in terms of Quine.) Note that, by
using quotation marks, we mention rather than use the rst two letters of
the alphabet. Applying the considerations above we arrive at the following
formulation of the Adder paradox.
Let 1 symbolize the denotation function in language L1 dened for all the
terms of L1, and let us baptize the symbol \ `1(a)+1' ", using the letter \a"
for its name; that is, we declare that a = `1(a) + 1', where \a = `1(a) + 1' "
is an object language sentence. Following Tarski, we can talk about this sen-
tence on a metalanguage level. We can talk about truth, or about what terms
denote on both sides of identity relations, only at the level of metalanguage.
We can claim at the metalanguage level that 2(a) = 2(`1(a) + 1'), where
2 means the `denote' function in L2 dened for all the terms of L2. (For
the sake of simplicity we suppose that the metalanguage contains the ob-
ject language as a part.) It follows from D2 that 2(`1(a) + 1') = 1(a) + 1,
hence 2(a) = 1(a) + 1, but this sentence of L2 does not contradict Peano's
axioms. In this way the contradiction immediately disappears, thus|not
surprisingly|we have eliminated the paradox. Sometimes it is worth using
Tarski's solution rather than merely mentioning it.
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